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“How can we as an individual protect ourselves if there is a cost to protecting
ourselves?”
“I mean, the short answer is pay the cost. The longer answer is you can’t.” 1
INTRODUCTION
As the privacy bubble slowly shrinks, privacy increases in value. 2 Basic
economics dictates that if supply for a desirable good lessens, people will pay more
to access that good. 3 As the Internet of Things (IoT) 4 continually expands into more
*
1

2

3
4

J.D., Indiana University Maurer School of Law, 2021; Editor-in-Chief, Indiana Journal of Law & Social
Equality, Volume 9.
Bruce Schneier, Public-Interest Technologist & Fellow and Lecturer, Harvard Kennedy School, Securing a
World of Physically Capable Computers (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hj53MF7ww-g
(during question and answer at minute forty-seven).
Privacy bubble is the author’s term to refer to the scope of available privacy. A smaller bubble means that
the amount of available privacy is likewise diminished and that previously noninvasive goods or services no
longer respect privacy.
See, e.g., STEVEN A. GREENLAW & TIMOTHY TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 64 (2014).
Andrew Whitmore, Anurag Agarwal & Li Da Xu, The Internet of Things—A Survey of Topics and Trends, 17
INFO. SYSTEMS FRONTIERS 261, 261 (2014) (“While there is no universal definition for the IoT, the core
concept is that everyday objects can be equipped with identifying, sensing, networking, and processing
capabilities that will allow them to communicate with one another and with other devices and services over
the Internet to achieve some useful objective.”).
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facets of everyday life under the guise of innovation, 5 privacy decreases. The tech
industry, in relentless pursuit of technological progress, is creating increasingly
invasive products like smart diapers, always-on smart speakers, and facial
recognition technology. 6 The tech industry consequently justifies its actions as the
next step in technological evolution. 7
This Note will explore the relationship between privacy and consumers’
relative wealth by examining how privacy is increasingly inaccessible to individuals
in low-income groups. Although the tech industry attempts to justify itself, its
evolution underscores technology’s pervasiveness and the growing emphasis on
collecting personal data. 8 Privacy’s necessity and societal implications should be
analyzed against this backdrop. Increased surveillance and technological
monitoring, however innocuous they seem, raise the specter of diminishing privacy
rights, especially for individuals in low-income groups. Were this not the case, there
would be little reason for a large, forerunning tech company like Apple to proclaim
that it believes “[p]rivacy is a fundamental human right.” 9
In 2019, two large tech giants came to blows in the media by disparaging
each other’s approaches to privacy. In an op-ed, Google CEO Sundar Pichai
indirectly criticized Apple for marketing privacy as a luxury good that is only
available to the rich. 10 Tim Cook, the CEO of Apple, denied that Apple is using
privacy as a selling point and insisted that privacy is desired by and developed for
the consumer. 11 Although this exchange looked largely like a marketing ploy, Pichai
accurately diagnosed the problem: privacy is expensive to get and to maintain. 12 His
statement also assumed that privacy is a good rather than an abstract principle,
and he further advocated that privacy should not be a luxury good but rather a
public good, something that is available to everyone. 13 Merely saying privacy should
be a public good, though, does not address how to support that good. Generally, the

5

6
7
8

9
10
11

12
13

See Rose Eveleth, The Biggest Lie Tech People Tell Themselves — and the Rest of Us, VOX (Oct. 8, 2019, 6:05
AM), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/2019/10/1/20887003/tech-technology-evolution-natural-inevitableethics.
See id.; Charlie Warzel, Opinion, Why You Shouldn’t Believe Tech Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/opinion/tech-companies-facial-recognition.html.
Eveleth, supra note 5.
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 2019: THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST 5 (2019),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/ceo-survey/2019/Theme-assets/reports/technology-trends-report-2019.pdf;
GRANT THORNTON, THE FUTURE OF GROWTH AND THE TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY 12 (2017),
https://www.grantthornton.com/~/media/content-page-files/campaigns/growth/pdfs/2017/Future-GrowthTech-report.ashx.
Privacy, https://www.apple.com/privacy/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20191205184828/https://www.apple.com/privacy/] (last visited Dec. 4, 2019).
Sundar Pichai, Opinion, Google’s Sundar Pichai: Privacy Should Not Be a Luxury Good, N.Y. TIMES (May 7,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/opinion/google-sundar-pichai-privacy.html.
Steven Musil, Apple is Pushing ‘Privacy Protections Forward,’ CEO Tim Cook Says, CNET (July 3, 2019,
4:22 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/apple-is-pushing-privacy-protections-forward-ceo-tim-cook-says/.
See Pichai, supra note 10.
Id.
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private sector underprovides public goods, so government intervention is necessary
to preserve or provide them. 14
Privacy is indeed becoming increasingly expensive. Although there is not a
quantitative assessment of privacy, it has economic value due to the information it
protects. 15 Consequently, individuals must be able to afford privacy before they can
benefit from it. Thus, wealth is relevant to privacy discourse regarding consumer
products. Privacy already relates to wealth—specifically to poverty—but, until
recently, the conversation has emphasized privacy invasions through social welfare
rather than through exploitative commodification. 16 A recent article regarding
privacy for low-income groups, however, analyzes the impact that data collection
and algorithms have on individuals in low-income groups, but it does not address
how privacy is marketed and priced to exclude individuals in low-income groups. 17
This Note will fill that literary gap and will analyze how the commodification of
privacy entrenches existing socioeconomic gaps by pricing privacy at a premium.
There is more than data collection at stake if people cannot protect their privacy
from the goods that they buy.
Part I of this Note will address the literature on the economics of privacy. It
will introduce the current economic theories of privacy with a central analysis on
whether privacy is a public good. If privacy is best conceptualized as a public good,
then the methods to address privacy disparities must change accordingly.
Additionally, this Part will examine the current relationship between poverty and
privacy and the diminished rights that low-income people experience.
Part II will show how the commodification and increasing cost of privacy
worsen socio-economic gaps and negatively impact associated minority groups. This
will include an analysis of several industries that are incorporating technology and
data collection practices that endanger privacy for individuals in low-income groups.
This Part will also demonstrate that individuals in low-income groups are unable to
curb privacy’s diminution with their purchasing power due to the lack of affordable
alternatives.
After presenting the problem, Part III will propose solutions to equalize
access to privacy. Tech companies have failed to quickly implement proper privacy
safeguards that are inclusive and affordable. Therefore, although the private sector
14

15
16

17

See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE 20–21 (2d ed. 1965)
(“The reason a government must provide certain types of goods and services is that the private sector
cannot be depended upon to offer them in appropriate amounts . . . [based on] the theory of externalities.”).
Baumol identifies the free-rider problem: noncontributors cannot be excluded from accessing a good, so
there is a like incentive for everyone to not contribute. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 6 (1990).
Anna H. Davis, Nuala O’Connor, Matthew Fitzsimmons & Lisa J. Sotto, The Economics of Privacy and Data
Security, 9 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 461, 462 (2013).
See generally Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389 (2012)
(showing how the welfare system unduly intrudes on low income individuals’ privacy to administrate
programs).
See generally Mary Madden, Michele Gilman, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data:
A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53 (2017) (examining how algorithms
affect employment, education, and policing in ways that detrimentally impact low-income groups).
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has tried to address privacy concerns after significant missteps, 18 government
intervention is necessary to protect privacy for individuals in low-income groups.
I. CONCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY
A. Economics of Privacy
In a typical economic model, the value of privacy reflects an individual’s
valuation of the underlying information that privacy protects. 19 Despite the
distinction, the literature largely considers the economic significance of personal
information and its production. 20 Regardless, privacy affects various transactions
because privacy encompasses many types of information. 21
Due to its abstract nature, privacy operates like a nonstandard economic
good. Usually, if the cost of production increases, the amount of production
decreases. However, increasing the cost of information production may increase the
quantity of information produced. 22 In other words, more privacy could mean that
more data will be produced. 23 This unusual outcome relies on there being negative,
rather than positive, production externalities. 24 While negative externalities in data
production were previously considered purely theoretical, 25 consent arrangements
to disclose data impose these negative externalities. 26 Yet, when people give their
consent to pierce the privacy barrier, they are increasingly likely to share
information that relates to others. 27 Indirectly sharing third-party information is a

18

19

20
21

22
23
24

25
26

27

See Sheera Frenkel & Natasha Singer, Facebook Introduces Central Page for Privacy and Security Settings,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/technology/facebook-privacy-securitysettings.html (responding to the Cambridge Analytica breach by implementing system to control user
privacy).
See Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John & George Loewenstein, What is Privacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD.
249, 250–51 (2013) (summarizing research that evaluates privacy based on the personal information
involved).
Id.
See generally Hal. R. Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, in INTERNET POLICY AND ECONOMICS:
CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 101, 101–06 (2d ed. 2002) (describing how privacy interacts with various
transactions including general purchases, subscription services, and insurance).
John P. Gould, Privacy and the Economics of Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 827, 834 (1980).
Id.
Id.; MATTHEW BISHOP, ESSENTIAL ECONOMICS 94–95 (2004) (defining an externality as “[a]n economic sideeffect” in which “costs or benefits arising from an economic activity . . . affect somebody other than the
people engaged in the economic activity and are not reflected fully in prices.”).
Gould, supra note 22.
Yoan Hermstrüwer, Contracting Around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law and Economics of Consent and Big
Data, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L. 9, 12 (2017).
Id.
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negative externality for those who did not consent to sharing information about
themselves, 28 creating what is known as a negative privacy externality. 29
Situations that produce negative privacy externalities generally create
exclusive systems that pressure individuals to consent. In consent-based data
sharing systems, using a beneficial service is inextricably linked to data sharing
agreements. 30 Alternatively, companies slowly whittle away privacy by making
access contingent on privacy invasions. 31 If users refuse to consent to these privacy
invasions, then, depending on the service, they are negatively impacted by those
who choose to sacrifice their privacy. 32 If a service is too useful to avoid using, then
companies will “impose take-it-or-leave-it options on users” because there are no
meaningful alternatives. 33 The goal is to increase transaction costs “to discourage
consumers from taking steps to avoid data collection.” 34 Without a given service,
individuals will incur higher transaction costs, which users can mitigate by opting
in to data collection and processing agreements. 35
When considering the value of privacy, there must be a countervailing
evaluation of the cost of data protection, which is a burden typically felt by the
business holding that data. 36 Businesses valuate privacy as a relationship between
the probability of a data breach and reasonable mitigation costs to prevent a
breach. 37 Consequently, businesses will valuate privacy less than the socially
optimal value because they are primarily concerned with internal costs. 38 To solve
this problem, the government can impose regulations that will force companies to
provide an appropriate amount of security to prevent breaches. 39 The contours of
the cost-benefit analysis surrounding privacy expose the importance of privacy to
the consumer and to companies.

28

29
30
31

32
33
34
35

36
37
38
39

Id.; Mark MacCarthy, New Direction in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 6 J.L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 425, 448 (2011).
MacCarthy, supra note 28, at 447 (defining a negative privacy externality as a situation in which “indirectly
obtained information can be used to the detriment of the data subject”).
See Hermstrüwer, supra note 26, at 13.
Christopher W. Savage, Managing the Ambient Trust Commons: The Economics of Online Consumer
Information Privacy, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 95, 109 (2019).
See MacCarthy, supra note 28, at 447.
Hermstrüwer, supra note 26, at 13.
Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 95, 147.
Joseph A. Tomain, Online Privacy & the First Amendment: An Opt-In Approach to Data Processing, 83 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2014).
Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic and Legal
Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1084 (2009).
See id.
Id. at 1084, 1089.
See, e.g., id. at 1089 fig.7 (showing that government regulation enforces the socially optimal amount of
mitigation costs).
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While addressing businesses, there is another dimension to privacy that
involves how businesses curate information and, subsequently, privacy. 40 When
businesses interact with privacy, they operate within a digital trust commons. 41 A
commons refers to a resource that is shared by producers and that replenishes itself
over time, assuming that it is not overused. 42 The trust commons refers to an
implicit understanding between businesses and consumers that businesses will not
hurt consumers who share information online. 43 Currently, the information
commons is teetering on the edge of a tragedy, meaning that the commons has been
overused. 44 Trust in the commons is contingent on an understanding that data
recipients will not harm the users who provide information. 45 The higher the chance
that there will be a breach revealing embarrassing or damaging information, the
less forthcoming people will be with their data. 46 Frequent data breaches or risks of
privacy invasions diminish digital trust and reduce users’ overall data sharing. 47
Therefore, privacy becomes more valuable if there is less trust. Since trust lessens
after data breaches, 48 people are more likely to desire privacy-keeping alternatives
if there is a high risk of data breaches. 49
Although the privacy market adheres to economic principles, the market
system oversimplifies the abstract nature of privacy. 50 Recognizing privacy as a
public good would better address its economic particularities. 51
B. Privacy as a Public Good
If privacy is relevant to the community at large, then it is likely better
understood as a public good. Interestingly, the literature about the economics of
privacy identifies factors that liken privacy to a public good without stating that
privacy actually is a public good. Early privacy research identified that privacy
exhibited qualities representative of public goods. 52 Since public goods provide
40

41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48
49
50
51
52

See Denis D. Hirsch, Privacy, Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the Trust Commons: A Response to
Professors Fairfield and Engel, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 67, 68–69 (2016) (recognizing that an analysis of
privacy requires considering businesses, not just individuals and groups).
See id. at 82. See generally Savage, supra note 31, at 114–31 (providing historical context and definition for
a trust commons).
Savage, supra note 31, at 116.
Hirsch, supra note 40, 82–83.
Id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
Savage, supra note 31, at 137.
See Hirsch, supra note 40, at 83–84 (describing trust failures regarding credit transactions at Target and in
sharing sensitive information on search engines).
Savage, supra note 31, at 137–38; Hirsch, supra note 40, at 83–84.
See Hirsch, supra note 40, at 83 (reporting that shoppers were more inclined to use cash after a credit cardrelated data breach).
See Savage, supra note 31, at 107–09.
See, e.g., id. at 110.
See Gould, supra note 22, at 833 (referring to a “public-good externality” in the economic conception of
privacy).
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societal benefits and information has independent value, privacy has a value
associated with its underlying information. 53 Yet privacy acts like an abstract social
construct that suffers from the same social problems that are endemic to public
goods. 54 Much like how a commons will fail if overused, public goods will be
underprovided if supplied by private industry. 55
Due to negative privacy externalities, the public experiences a general loss of
privacy every time someone overshares information that could provide information
about others. 56 While privacy is a public good, the lack of privacy created through
oversharing is a public bad. 57 Consider the case in which credit agencies use
publicly available information about someone’s social connections to create a credit
profile. 58 Both individuals suffer from diminished privacy because one individual
shares information that reveals something about someone else. In this scenario,
both individuals (and anyone else that could be implicated by shared information)
experience a public bad. Likewise, insurance companies could more accurately
price-discriminate if they had more information about their customers. 59
Theoretically, one factor could “facilitate an inference regarding information an
individual has chosen not to reveal, or perhaps even something she did not know
about herself.” 60 Thus, sharing too much information reinforces the public bad by
diminishing overall privacy.
One of the social problems created by privacy is that many individuals do not
anticipate the harms that data sharing can produce. Based on the above analogies,
individuals do not evaluate the impact that their actions could have on others.
Individuals are likely to only evaluate the personal costs that they would experience
rather than the total social harms that society would experience. 61 In some
circumstances, personal data can affect others because those data are incorporated
into machine learning algorithms. 62 Resultantly, “the generosity of volunteers with
respect to their personal data creates a system that almost exclusively impacts
others.” 63 Machine learning algorithms affect anyone who interacts with the
algorithm, rather than solely those who have provided information.

53
54
55
56
57
58

59
60
61
62
63

See supra text accompanying notes 22–35.
See Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 423 (2015).
See BAUMOL, supra note 14.
See Fairfield & Engel, supra note 54.
Id.
See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive
Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 100 n.46, 101 (2014) (noting that big data can create individual profiles
from information such as Facebook likes).
See Fairfield & Engel, supra note 54, at 389.
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 406.
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C. Poverty and Diminished Privacy
Privacy already has a negative relationship with low-income groups due to
the administrative and informational requirements of the current welfare system. 64
Welfare administrators distribute aid based on a bracketed system, and they
require large amounts of personal information to organize individual applicants into
the appropriate brackets. 65 Thus, low-income individuals have a lesser expectation
of privacy that is directly tied to their financial status. 66 This reality is true for
people in the welfare system and also for those exposed to data collection services. 67
Current data collection practices already exploit low-income individuals who
use mobile technology more than other people in other socioeconomic groups who
also use mobile devices. 68 Low-income individuals provide more location data that
can reveal information about habits and lifestyle and are more likely to suffer from
overly broad app access, which can include microphone or other permissions. 69
However, the main issue regarding data exploitation and the low-income population
is that the current data collection market reinforces biases. 70 Low-income people
can consequently become trapped in a privacy spiral because their data are
consistently exploited. The reinforcement and perpetual network effects that lowincome individuals experience perpetuate negative perceptions about them. 71
Exploitative data relationships reinforce existing problems in the same way that
credit scores become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 72
The prevalence of “algorithmic profiling,” or methods that use data to
categorize and assess individuals, contribute to the circular harms that low-income
individuals experience. 73 Algorithms are increasingly used in job hiring through
applicant tracking systems, 74 college admissions processes, 75 and predictive policing
models. 76 These algorithms perpetuate the aforementioned data exploitation issues
by forcing low-income individuals into categories that are difficult to change.
Turning from the data collection market to the welfare system, welfare
recipients have considerably fewer privacy rights. States have discretion to regulate

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

See Gilman, supra note 16, at 1391–92.
See id. (noting that states have large discretion regarding requisite information to receive welfare).
See id.
See Madden et al., supra note 17 (examining poverty and privacy in data collection).
Id. at 69–70, 72 tbl.1.
Id. at 71, 73–74.
See id. at 56–57.
See id.
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89
WASH. L. REV. 1, 18 (2014).
See Nathan Newman, Comment on Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion? Workshop 1, 3 (Aug. 15,
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2014/08/00015-92370.pdf.
Madden et al., supra note 17, at 79.
Id. at 95–96.
Id. at 104–05.
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welfare systems and may administrate them differently. 77 Regardless, maintaining
these programs can be invasive to a general right to privacy. 78 Welfare systems
involve ongoing surveillance that may include drug tests, intrusive questioning
about personal matters, and finger imaging. 79 Even private entities will scrutinize
and surveil those on welfare systems by monitoring their communications and
choices. 80 Altogether, extensive data collection like that in welfare systems can trap
recipients in a “digital poorhouse” 81 that discourages them from seeking
assistance 82 and can unnecessarily increase their visibility to law enforcement. 83
Data collection in the welfare system is increasingly combined with
algorithms and data processing systems to identify people in need. Previously,
government entities focused on information that could be gathered through in
person interviews, regular meetings, 84 and perusal of public records. 85 These
methods involve human interaction and individual assessments, which are timeconsuming, more costly, and susceptible to bias and human error. In recent years,
face-to-face assessments have diminished in favor of computerized systems that
reduce costs and purportedly increase efficiency. 86 These systems “automate,
predict, identify, surveil, detect, target and punish” people who interact with
welfare systems. 87 For welfare recipients, digital welfare monitoring presents risks
to civil liberties and human rights, namely relinquishing a right to privacy, creating
conflicting interests by mingling public and private surveillance, and allowing
harassment of low-income individuals, among others. 88 While monitoring may seem
beneficial, these systems operate on large amounts of data that exploit and invade
the privacy of welfare recipients in a way that recipients cannot readily combat. 89
77
78
79
80
81

82
83

84
85

86

87

88
89

Gilman, supra note 16, at 1391.
See id. at 1391–92.
Id.
Id. at 1392.
VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR
12–13 (2018); see also Liza Featherstone, How Big Data is ‘Automating Inequality,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/books/review/automating-inequality-virginia-eubanks.html
(book review) (“[G]overnment data and its abuses have imposed a new regime of surveillance, profiling,
punishment, containment and exclusion . . . .”).
EUBANKS, supra note 81, at 178 (“Like the brick-and-mortar poorhouse, the digital poorhouse diverts the
poor from public resources.”).
See Mikell Hyman, Computers Can’t Override America’s Antipathy Towards the Poor, 60 EUR. J. SOC. 406,
410 (2019) (book review) (summarizing how expansive data collection in Los Angeles allows authorities to
access an low income individual’s personal information without a warrant).
See Gilman, supra note 16, at 1391–92.
See, e.g., REBECCA T. LEEB, LEONARD J. PAULOZZI, CINDI MELANSON, THOMAS R. SIMON & ILEANA ARIAS, CHILD
MALTREATMENT SURVEILLANCE: UNIFORM DEFINITIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH AND RECOMMENDED DATA
ELEMENTS 4 (2008), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/cm_surveillance-a.pdf.
See Philip Alston (Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights), Extreme Poverty and
Human Rights, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/74/493 (Oct. 11, 2019) (melding political buzzwords with “neoliberal
economic policies” to create a welfare system that is justified by “new digital technologies”).
Id. ¶ 3. Alston identified an international trend that Eubanks identified at a national level. Cf.
Featherstone, supra note 81 (defining the digital poorhouse).
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, supra note 86, ¶¶ 64–67.
See id. ¶ 6.
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This research establishes that individuals in low-income groups have a
diminished sense of privacy because they are vulnerable to expansive data
collection. Either companies target them for data collection, or the government
justifies intrusions with a compelling reason to seek information.
II. INTERSECTION OF PRIVACY AND WEALTH
Having addressed privacy’s economic status and its relationship with
poverty, there is still the problem at hand: the disparate impact caused by pricing
privacy. For years, there has been a growing notion that privacy is becoming
increasingly expensive, 90 which is not as burdensome for the wealthy who can
simply afford the higher costs, “[y]et poor people are entitled to privacy, even if they
can’t afford all the gadgets of the wealthy for ensuring it.” 91 At a more fundamental
level, the wealthy can better insulate themselves against invasive data practices. 92
Individuals in low-income groups, on the other hand, are susceptible to
excessive data collection. The tech industry in particular touts privacy initiatives
and services in its products while simultaneously incorporating data collection into
more commonplace products and places. The incorporation of surveillance and
privacy-intruding technologies make data collection more routine while making
privacy (or avoiding data collection) more costly. This Part will address several
sectors that demonstrate this problem.
A. Housing
Housing is not the most apparent sector that sacrifices privacy for low-income
individuals. Nonetheless, housing provides a salient example of diminishing
privacy. These privacy intrusions are also ostensibly premised on increasing
security.
The increasing use and pervasiveness of facial recognition technology in
housing demonstrates how privacy is tied to income. Consequently, facial
recognition technology has become a hot button issue in certain areas. For example,
in early May 2019, the Atlantic Plata Towers in Brooklyn (a low-income residence)
announced plans to install facial recognition technology to replace key fobs and

90

91
92

See, e.g., Arwa Mahdawi, Opinion, Why Digital Privacy is Only for the Rich, GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2014, 11:56
AM), https://amp.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/12/digital-privacy-mainstream-concern
(“Privacy isn’t dead, but it’s getting very expensive.”).
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (memorandum) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
Consider that a benefit of wealth is the ability to better secure property: “Few people, other than the very
wealthy, barricade their front yard so completely that a person seeking to enter must request the unlocking
of a solid gate that is higher than eye level.” United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1130 (7th Cir. 1998)
(Posner, J., dissenting).
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increase security. 93 Over 130 tenants responded by filing a petition to block the
installation because the technology is discriminatory and the premises already had
adequate security through cameras and security guards. 94 This is one example of a
growing problem: landlords are installing facial recognition technology in lowincome housing developments despite arguments that the technology is
“discriminatory, because many tenants are people of color.” 95 Notably, facial
recognition technology is unreliable for minorities, especially for determining the
gender of dark-skinned women, which, in some cases, reaches error rates of 46.5%
and 46.8%. 96
This problem has become an increasing concern for public housing
developments. Public housing refers to housing that is subsidized or provided by the
government and is typically intended for “low-income families, the elderly, and
persons with disabilities.” 97 Public housing developments have already begun
implementing facial recognition technology despite the apparent risks to vulnerable
groups. 98 The risks and problems with facial recognition technology worsen because
minorities dominate the cities that are implementing facial recognition into public
housing. 99 The footage from facial recognition devices may be shared with police, 100
which further diminishes privacy for those who live in public housing developments,
specifically racial minorities and other minority groups associated with low-income
neighborhoods. Intermingling the government, law enforcement, and public housing
detrimentally impacts low-income individuals specifically because they are poor.
Despite the growing use of facial recognition technology, there is a general
distrust of the technology for certain purposes. Consider a recent Pew poll that
found only one-third of adults trust tech companies to use facial recognition data
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Tanvi Misra, The Tenants Fighting Back Against Facial Recognition Technology, BLOOMBERG: CITYLAB (May
7, 2019, 1:35 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-07/when-facial-recognition-tech-comesto-housing; Erin Durkin, New York Tenants Fight as Landlords Embrace Facial Recognition Cameras,
GUARDIAN (May 30, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/may/29/new-york-facialrecognition-cameras-apartment-complex.
Durkin, supra note 93.
Angela Chen, This is How You Kick Facial Recognition out of Your Town, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/614477/facial-recognition-law-enforcement-surveillance-privateindustry-regulation-ban-backlash/.
Larry Hardesty, Study Finds Gender and Skin-Type Bias in Commercial Artificial-Intelligence Systems,
MIT NEWS OFF. (Feb. 11, 2018), https://news.mit.edu/2018/study-finds-gender-skin-type-bias-artificialintelligence-systems-0212 (“For darker-skinned women—those assigned scores of IV, V, or VI on the
Fitzpatrick scale—the error rates were 20.8 percent, 34.5 percent, and 34.7.”). See generally Joy
Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender
Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 77 (2018).
HUD’s Public Housing Program, U.S. DEP’T PUB. HOUS.,
https://www.hud.gov/topics/rental_assistance/phprog (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
See Lola Fadulu, Facial Recognition Technology in Public Housing Prompts Backlash, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/us/politics/facial-recognition-technology-housing.html.
See id.
Id.
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responsibly. 101 The results are similarly even regarding whether landlords should
use facial recognition for tracking residents and visitors: thirty-six percent found
this acceptable while thirty-four percent found this unacceptable. 102 Although this
technology is generally distrusted, landlords are increasingly installing it despite
the increased rental price for regular tenants 103 and the negative privacy
implications for low-income individuals.
Facial recognition technology has tainted other home technologies like
Amazon’s Ring doorbell. While Ring doorbells do not have facial recognition
technology installed right now, it was recently discovered that Amazon has plans to
potentially add facial recognition to Ring doorbells so that the doorbells could notify
police about suspicious individuals at the door. 104 Not only does this implementation
present a similar risk to those already mentioned regarding facial recognition
technology but this information would be directly shared with law enforcement.
Amazon already coordinates with police agencies to share Ring footage from
doorbells to supposedly increase public safety. 105 Normally, these devices cost one
hundred dollars, but Amazon has donated Ring doorbells to police departments to
support their widespread installation. 106 Although Amazon’s actions may seem
unrelated to privacy and its relationship to wealth, providing free technology
incentivizes low-income individuals to accept free doorbell upgrades that they would
not purchase otherwise. However, after sharing footage, there is no oversight by
Ring to control the usage of shared footage. 107
Ring doorbells had privacy risks that impacted individuals in low-income
groups before the potential inclusion of facial recognition. The doorbells share
surveillance footage of neighbors and, thereby, impose negative externalities on
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Aaron Smith, More Than Half of U.S. Adults Trust Law Enforcement to Use Facial Recognition Responsibly,
PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/09/05/more-than-half-of-u-sadults-trust-law-enforcement-to-use-facial-recognition-responsibly/.
Id.
Alfred Ng, Your Landlord Turns Your Apartment into a Smart Home. Now What?, CNET (Mar. 7, 2019,
5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/your-landlord-turns-your-apartment-into-a-smart-home-now-what/.
Ryan Morrison, Amazon Faces Privacy Backlash over Its Plan to Add Face Scanning Technology to Ring
Doorbells to Warn Home Owners About ‘Suspicious People’ Outside Their Door, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 20, 2019,
6:13 AM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-7705631/Amazon-faces-privacy-backlash-plansadd-face-recognition-Ring-doorbells.html.
Drew Harwell, Doorbell-Camera Firm Ring Has Partnered with 400 Police Forces, Extending Surveillance
Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019, 6:53PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-camera-firm-ring-has-partnered-withpolice-forces-extending-surveillance-reach/ (reporting that over 400 police departments coordinate with
Ring).
Kari Paul, Amazon’s Doorbell Camera Ring is Working with Police – and Controlling What They Say,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/aug/29/ring-amazonpolice-partnership-social-media-neighbor (“Ring donated 80 doorbells to police [in Gwinnett county,
Georgia], valued at $15,920.”).
Samantha Masunaga, Police Can Keep Video from Ring Doorbells Indefinitely, Adding to Privacy Concerns,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2019, 9:32 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-11-20/ring-doorbellvideo-data-privacy (“And if the video is downloaded by the requesting police officer, Ring does not have any
restrictions on whom they can share it with and wouldn’t even know who else had seen the video.”).

316

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[9:304

others. 108 As this technology is incorporated into poor communities, it will exploit
individuals who are caught in footage that is subsequently shared with police.
While there is not direct information about who provides information to police,
there is pressure to provide information, especially based on the phrasing of sharing
requests. 109 Moreover, neighborhood social network technologies, such as Nextdoor,
have exhibited racial biases in the past. 110 Incorporating facial recognition into Ring
worsens these problem because facial recognition already discriminates against
people of color. 111 As with facial recognition in housing communities, the technology
would feasibly be used to deter break-ins and other crimes in poor, high-risk
neighborhoods, which can be discriminatory. Civil rights groups have already
condemned the technology for its potential discriminatory impact. 112 Poor
communities with fewer resources will have more difficulty resisting the imposition
of facial recognition technologies that ostensibly increase security while reinforcing
biases about neighborhoods permeated by the technology.
The main justification for diminishing privacy rights is to increase security at
the expense of privacy, but this reasoning emphasizes the economic risks of privacy.
People inadequately consider the risks to society at large by disclosing more
information that reveals things about themselves and others.
B. Automobiles and Self-Driving Technology
The automotive industry has similarly implemented features that diminish
privacy at the long-term expense of low-income individuals. The industry has
regularly added more technology to vehicles that allow manufacturers to collect vast
amounts of data. 113 Furthermore, the push for autonomous vehicles and increased
108
109
110

111

112

113

See supra Part I.B.
See Paul, supra note 106 (“Advocates have also questioned how comfortable users feel in denying law
enforcement requests.”).
See, e.g., Caroline O’Donovan, Racial Profiling is Still a Problem on Nextdoor, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 18,
2017, 5:15 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/racial-profiling-is-still-a-problemon-nextdoor (showing examples of racial profiling on a neighborhood site after attempting to prevent racial
profiling via algorithm).
Bryan Pietsch, Amazon’s Ring Camera Raises Civil Liberties Concerns: U.S. Senator, REUTERS (Sept. 5,
2019, 5:16 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-ring-markey/amazons-ring-camera-raises-civilliberties-concerns-u-s-senator-idUSKCN1VQ2QW. Notably, the drive to discourage Amazon from using
facial recognition technology is not new. Amazon has provided its technology, named Rekognition, to law
enforcement and businesses despite the risks of discrimination. Kaitlin Benz, ACLU Wants Amazon to Stop
Offering Surveillance Technology, CNET (June 18, 2018, 2:47 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/aclu-wantsamazon-to-stop-offering-surveillance-technology-rekognition/; Ry Crist, Amazon’s Rekognition Software Lets
Cops Track Faces: Here’s What You Need to Know, CNET (Mar. 19, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/what-is-amazon-rekognition-facial-recognition-software/.
E.g., Letter from ACLU et al. to Jeffrey P. Bezos, Founder and CEO, Amazon.com, Inc. (May 22, 2018),
https://www.aclunc.org/docs/20180522_AR_Coalition_Letter.pdf.
John R. Quain, Cars Suck up Data About You. Where Does It All Go?, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/automobiles/wheels/car-data-tracking.html. See generally Dorothy J.
Glancy, Autonomous and Automated and Connected Cars – Oh My: First Generation Autonomous Cars in
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analytics raises privacy and commodification concerns. Data are easily
misappropriated, 114 and there is economic incentive to standardize invasive
technology. 115
Data misappropriation is a significant problem when coupled with the
expansion of data collection. Known as mission creep, private corporations and the
government initially collect data for one purpose but repurpose the data after they
have been collected. 116 Data collection in vehicles has expanded over the past
twenty years given the rise in connected cars. 117 Herein lies the current problem
with connected cars: as cars increasingly collect data, “it will become difficult to
avoid a vehicle set up for gathering data that will be sent to automakers.” 118
Automakers already market vehicles that almost exclusively have digital
interfaces and technology that collect information. The most recent, low-end models
include digital interfaces as standard features that include GPS technology and the
ability to connect to a mobile device. 119 Incorporating data collection into cheaper
vehicles increases the data pool and allows automakers to access poorer individuals
who could otherwise not afford expensive automotive technology. Automakers have
significant incentives to collect data because cars produce large amounts of data
during regular use. 120 Rather concerningly, automakers could incentivize data
sharing by exchanging something of value or could use the data for tailored in-car
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117
118
119

120

the Legal Ecosystem, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 619, 635–38 (2015) (describing sensor and GPS technology
that are prevalent in vehicles and that gather data); David M. Katz, Privacy in the Private Sector: Use of the
Automotive Industry’s Event Data Recorder and Cable Industry’s Interactive Television in Collecting
Personal Data, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 163, 169–72 (2003) (detailing how event data recorders,
known as black box devices, collect data that is used for analysis).
See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, How Technology Drives Vehicular Privacy, 2 J.L. & POL’Y
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 981, 984 (2006).
See MCKINSEY&CO, MONETIZING CAR DATA: NEW SERVICE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES TO CREATE NEW
CUSTOMER BENEFITS 11 exhibit 2 (2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Automotive%20and%20Assembly/Our%20Insights
/Monetizing%20car%20data/Monetizing%20Car%20Data.ashx (showing potential revenue increase from
collecting automobile data).
McDonald & Cranor, supra note 114.
Michael Liedtke, How is Data Being Collected and Used in My Car, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 25, 2018, 2:30 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/autos/sc-auto-tips-0102-driving-data-collection-20181225-story.html.
Id.
See Build Your Own: 2021 Cars, Trucks, Crossovers and SUVs, CHEVROLET,
https://www.chevrolet.com/build-your-own-chevrolet (select “2021 Vehicles” tab; then “Spark” model;
navigate to “Interior” tab from top navigation pane; click on information symbol under “Radio”) (last visited
Mar. 1, 2021) (Spark with standard color touchscreen); Build & Price Your New Jeep® SUV or Truck
Today!, JEEP, https://www.jeep.com/bmo.html#/vehicles (select “Wrangler” model; then “Sport;” navigate to
“Interior” tab from top navigation pane; then select “More info” next to “Sound Systems”) (last visited Mar.
1, 2021) (Wrangler Sport with standard touchscreen display); Build Your Own Toyota, TOYOTA,
https://www.toyota.com/configurator (select “Yaris” model; then “View Details” under “Yaris L”) (last visited
Mar. 1, 2021) (Yaris L with standard touchscreen display). These exact vehicles may not be available in
every location, but comparable vehicles can be viewed by following similar steps.
See MCKINSEY & CO., CAR DATA: PAVING THE WAY TO VALUE-CREATING MOBILITY 5 exhibit 1 (2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Automotive%20and%20Assembly/Our%20Insights
/Creating%20value%20from%20car%20data/Creating%20value%20from%20car%20data.ashx (showing the
types of data that a car generates during use).
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advertising. 121 Although the exact use of collected data is unclear, these are possible
avenues to benefit from seemingly innocuous data collection that is present in
nearly all modern cars.
The ubiquity of data collection in cars creates privacy risks for low-income
individuals. The period of time in which new technology is priced significantly
higher presents accessibility issues for certain groups. As prices fall (which is the
case with automotive technology like interfaces and GPS), companies can make
these widely available and market them as convenient perks. However, the
technology exploits individuals in low-income groups because they exchange privacy
for convenience and cannot afford more privacy-centric alternatives (if those
alternatives exist). Since automakers know that car data is lucrative, there is an
incentive to make cars without data collection more expensive because the
manufacturers will not benefit from data collected post sale. Thus, the widespread
availability of invasive technologies in cars will negatively impact low-income
individuals who cannot opt out of data collection with their purchasing power.
Self-driving or autonomous vehicle technology also poses significant privacy
risks for individuals in low-income groups. Autonomous technology requires large
amounts of data that will make autonomous vehicles more capable of handling
every day or unexpected situations. Many manufacturers are already working with
independent companies to develop self-driving technology that will be integrated
into their future fleet of vehicles. 122 By adding more sensors and data collection to
vehicles, automakers hope to capitalize on large-scale data collection that will
enhance autonomous technology. 123 In the process, however, automakers increase
the likelihood that the government can invade individual privacy because vehicles
are more connected to penetrable wireless systems than ever before. 124 Further
allowing privacy invasions for individuals in low-income groups, who already have
diminished expectations of privacy if on welfare, 125 would allow excessive
exploitation of their data. These individuals would still not have the opportunity to
buy out of data collection technologies because the technology is becoming
ubiquitous. 126

121

122

123
124
125
126

Id. at 16 exhibits 16 & 17, 17 exhibit 18 (depicting economic potential from autonomous vehicles with data
sharing incentives and from in-car purchase recommendations).
Jeremy Kaplan, Here’s Every Company Developing Self-Driving Car Tech at CES 2018, DIGITAL TRENDS
(Jan. 7, 2018, 7:30 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/every-company-developing-self-driving-car-techces-2018/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20191114043303/https://www.digitaltrends.com/cars/every-companydeveloping-self-driving-car-tech-ces-2018/] (including Audi, BMW, Ferrari, Ford, Hyundai, Maserati,
Mazda, Nissan, and Volkswagen).
Raquel Toral, Evolving Autonomous Vehicle Technology and the Erosion of Privacy, 27 U. MIAMI BUS. L.
REV. 153, 156 (2018).
See id. at 158.
See supra Part I.C.
Peter Holley, Big Brother on Wheels: Why Your Car Company May Know More About You than Your Spouse,
WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2018, 7:56 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2018/01/15/big-brother-on-wheels-why-your-carcompany-may-know-more-about-you-than-your-spouse/.
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Companies are already projecting that new vehicles will be predominantly
connected in the coming years. 127 Although automakers collect fewer personal data
than other industries and technically gain consent, automakers often bury the
extent of their privacy invasions in fine print. 128 Individuals in low-income groups
are already vulnerable to exploitation, and the combined data collection by private
and government actors in the automotive industry subjects these people to another
avenue for privacy invasions.
C. Cellphones and Smartphones
If vehicles can collect vast amounts of data based on where people travel, 129
cellphones and smartphones (hereafter smartphones) collect even more information
because they accompany people everywhere. 130 The omnipresence of smartphones
has provided some benefits: smartphones enable varied research because they
collect large amounts of diverse information. 131 Although data collection on
smartphones has benefits, smartphones can potentially capture intrusive and
persistent data. A recently discovered location-tracking dataset revealed over fifty
billion location datapoints for over twelve million Americans, 132 and those data were
collectible through a variety of common apps. 133 Despite these risks, the
smartphone industry touts privacy as a feature rather than an implicit expectation,
which has negative consequences for individuals in low-income groups.
Recently, privacy has seen markedly more attention among smartphone
operating system developers. The increased interest in privacy is likely due to
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Id. (“By 2021, according to the technology research firm Gartner, 98 percent of new cars sold in the United
States and in Europe will be connected . . . .”).
Id.
Id.
See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Where Were You 3 Minutes Ago? Your Apps Know, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2015, 8:01
AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/03/23/where-were-you-3-minutes-ago-your-apps-know/?mod=LS1
[https://web.archive.org/web/20150324140410/http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/03/23/where-were-you-3minutes-ago-your-apps-know/] (reporting that a study found Android apps collected GPS data 6,200 times
over two weeks, which is about once every three minutes).
See generally, e.g., Gabriella M. Harari, Nicholas D. Lane, Rui Wang, Benjamin S. Crosier, Andrew T.
Campbell & Samuel D. Gosling, Using Smartphones to Collect Behavioral Data in Psychological Science:
Opportunities, Practical Considerations, and Challenges, 11 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 838 (2016) (describing
how smartphone sensors and records facilitate psychological study yet noting the inherent privacy
concerns).
Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Opinion, Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-cellphone.html.
Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Opinion, 8 Things to Know About Our Investigation into the
Location Business, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/nytcellphone-tracking-investigation.html (including “weather apps, games, podcast apps, news apps,
navigation apps and more”).
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largescale breaches related to mobile devices 134 and pressure from law enforcement
agencies to create security backdoors. 135 In response, companies have begun
marketing privacy to appeal to conscientious consumers, which has diminished
privacy from an expectation to a marketable feature. 136 A marketable feature merits
discussion because it distinguishes one smartphone from another, while an expected
feature does not warrant additional fanfare.
Consider Apple, a company that has put privacy at the forefront of the
smartphone market. Apple has zealously advocated for smartphone privacy while it
has simultaneously marketed privacy as a mainstream feature since at least
2016. 137 Before Apple began directly marketing privacy, it integrated a dedicated
privacy commitment into its website in 2014. 138 The privacy commitment became
accessible from the website’s main page on August 6, 2015, 139 signifying a firm and
forward commitment to privacy.
In contrast, Google has a history of expansive data collection. Google (the
developer of the Android OS) collects large amounts of data through mobile devices:
a 2018 study revealed that an Android phone with one open tab in Google Chrome
generated approximately forty passive data sharing requests per hour. 140 Over
twenty-four hours, this amounted to over nine hundred data transmissions,
including requests for location data, uploads for device-related data, Google Play
store requests, communications to advertising domains, and background service
134

135

136

137
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140

See Davey Winder, Data Breach Warning for 200 Million Android and iOS Gamers, FORBES (Sep. 30, 2019,
8:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2019/09/30/data-breach-warning-for-200-millionandroid-and-ios-gamers/?sh=53d897ad1db3 (200 million in Zynga breach); Guy Rosen, Security Update,
FACEBOOK (Sept. 28, 2018, 9:41 AM), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/09/security-update/ (fifty million in
Facebook breach).
See Andrew Blankstein, Judge Forces Apple to Help Unlock San Bernardino Shooter iPhone, NBC NEWS
(Feb. 16, 2016, 7:57PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/san-bernardino-shooting/judge-forces-applehelp-unlock-san-bernardino-shooter-iphone-n519701 (compelling Apple to provide the FBI with access to a
criminal’s iPhone); Pete Williams, FBI Seeks Apple’s Help Unlocking Phones of Suspected Pensacola Naval
Station Gunman, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2020, 10:26PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/fbi-seeksapple-s-help-unlocking-phones-suspected-pensacola-naval-n1111636.
From 2014 to approximately 2016, one could purchase an $800 (more than the iPhone 6 and 6s released
that year) Blackphone: a smartphone series specifically designed to protect privacy and data. See Natasha
Lomas, Silent Circle’s Blackphone Revealed as a Sales Flop, TECHCRUNCH (July 7, 2016, 8:02 AM),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/07/silent-circles-blackphone-revealed-as-a-sales-flop/; Cherlynn Low,
Blackphone 2 Review: Security, for a Price, TOM’S GUIDE (Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www.tomsguide.com/us/blackphone-2,review-3138.html.
iPhone 7: iOS 10, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone-7/ios/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160916093338/http:/www.apple.com/iphone-7/ios/] (last visited Dec. 2, 2019).
A Message from Tim Cook About Apple’s Commitment to Your Privacy, APPLE (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://www.apple.com/privacy/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20140930215042/http://www.apple.com/privacy/]
(last visited Dec. 2, 2019). Before an unspecified time in 2014, the same link only provided Apple’s generic
privacy policy. For an example of the webpage’s previous information, see Privacy Policy, APPLE,
http://www.apple.com/privacy/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20140227030722/http://www.apple.com/privacy/]
(last visited Dec. 2, 2019).
APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20150806215853/http://www.apple.com/] (last
visited Dec. 2, 2019) (under “Apple Values”).
Douglas C. Schmidt, Google Data Collection 14 fig.6 (Aug. 15, 2018) (on file with Digital Content Next),
https://digitalcontentnext.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/DCN-Google-Data-Collection-Paper.pdf.
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actions. 141 The same study using an iPhone with the Safari browser open found that
Apple made approximately four requests per hour, and these were primarily for
uploading device information with about one location request per day. 142
Although Apple professes to be committed to privacy and aggressively
safeguarding data, Apple has sparked criticism that it has marketed privacy as a
luxury good. 143 These criticisms, specifically from Google, characterize privacy as an
indulgence while presenting data sharing as a means to improve services for
everyone. 144 Thus, tech companies can argue that privacy is a hindrance to
improving systems and to providing goods and services.
The implication that privacy without data sharing is a luxury good
disadvantages individuals in low-income groups because privacy immediately
becomes inaccessible. If privacy is associated with high prices, which, judging by the
price of the newest iPhone, 145 is an apt criticism, then individuals in low-income
groups must settle for cheaper, less private alternatives. More dangerously, the
implication that privacy is too expensive could reinforce itself through economic
means. If the consensus is that privacy costs more, then companies have an
incentive to produce less costly goods that collect personal data. The reduced
upfront profit is effectively exchanged for post-sale value from the collected data,
which creates the same economic incentive present in the automotive industry. 146
The trade-off, upfront profit versus post-sale monetization, is economically
beneficial but sacrifices privacy, which can negatively impact those who are unable
to secure privacy through their purchasing power.
D. Wearable Technology
Wearable technology has created a more intimate relationship between
people and technology. Wearable technology refers to “electronic technologies or
computers that are incorporated into items of clothing and accessories which can
comfortably be worn on the body.” 147 Although wearable technology is frequently
associated with watches, it can also include jewelry, attachable baby monitors, and
sensor-laced apparel. 148 Most commonly, wearable technology is used to collect and
141
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143
144
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Id. at 14.
Id. at 14 fig.6 (“[T]he iPhone device’s communication with Apple’s servers were 10x less frequent than the
Android device’s communications with Google.”).
See Pichai, supra note 10.
See id. (“[D]ata makes the products and services you use more helpful to you. . . . [P]roducts use anonymous
data in aggregate to be more helpful to everyone.”).
Buy iPhone 12 Pro and iPhone 12 Pro Max, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/shop/buy-iphone/iphone-12-pro
(last visited Apr. 23, 2021) (listing the iPhone 12 Pro for $999, increasing to $1,099 for the Pro Max).
See supra Part II.B.
Kiana Tehrani & Andrew Michael, Wearable Technology and Wearable Devices: Everything You Need to
Know, WEARABLE DEVICES MAG., http://www.wearabledevices.com/what-is-a-wearable-device/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20191204134848/http://www.wearabledevices.com/what-is-a-wearable-device]
(last updated Mar. 26, 2014).
Janice Phaik Lin Goh, Privacy, Security, and Wearable Technology, LANDSLIDE, 30 (Dec. 2015).
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track health and fitness information, 149 which may include collecting location data
and data about heart rate, sleep cycle, and workout time. 150 This information can be
used to reconstruct someone’s daily routine or to accurately determine certain
bodily characteristics. 151 Consequently, wearable technology is ripe for abuse and
allows for additional tracking that decreases user privacy and that negatively
impacts already surveilled individuals in low-income groups.
While wearable technology is still somewhat new, it poses privacy risks like
many nascent technological innovations. Studies have found that people are
concerned about privacy risks for wearable technology: a 2015 study found that
approximately twenty-five percent of respondents believed that using wearable
technology likely presented privacy risks, 152 and another survey found that eightytwo percent of consumers were concerned that wearable technology would invade
personal privacy. 153 These concerns are justified because wearable technology stores
information that “is worth ten times that of a credit card on a black market.” 154 This
outsized value is due to the large amount of information that wearable technology
can collect, and it can be information that an average person would not perceive as
valuable. 155
Although the average consumer might not know the value of collected data,
lawyers and law enforcement have found the data to be valuable in judicial
proceedings. For instance, attorneys in Canada successfully used Fitbit data to
show that a woman’s physical activity diminished after an accident. 156 Due to her
injuries, she underperformed the “average woman of her age and profession.” 157 In
another case, law enforcement used Fitbit data to disprove an alleged rape victim’s
testimony and charge her with perjury. 158 The victim claimed that someone raped
her in her sleep, but her Fitbit data showed that she was likely awake and walking
149
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158

John T. Katuska, Wearing Down HIPAA: How Wearable Technologies Erode Privacy Protections, 44 J. CORP.
L. 385, 386 n.1 (2018) (defining wearable health technology as “all wearable devices that can or do collect
and track health, fitness, or wellness information of the wearer”).
Teena Maddox, The Dark Side of Wearables: How They’re Secretly Jeopardizing Your Security and Privacy,
TECHREPUBLIC (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/the-dark-side-of-wearables-how-theyresecretly-jeopardizing-your-security-and-privacy/.
Heidi Hall, Vanderbilt Alum, Retired CIA Chief Tech Officer Talks Wearables, VAND. U. SCH. ENGINEERING
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around when the alleged rape occurred. 159 The lawyers in these cases used wearable
data for opposite purposes, but they reveal the same danger: wearable technology
could reveal incriminating information beyond location information. Information
like whether someone was running or whether their heartbeat increased at a
certain time could be pertinent to judicial proceedings, and wearable technology
collects this information in spades.
Individuals in low-income groups are already surveilled, but wearable
technology presents another avenue through which to monitor them. For instance,
employers in the service industry (which employs low-wage workers), use overt
tactics to monitor employees, like psychological testing, frequent drug screenings,
and video monitoring. 160 Employers could supply wearable technology to further
track their employees or to verify whether an employee engaged in certain behavior.
Some businesses are considering the applications for wearable technology to
prevent workers compensation claims. 161 Wearable technology could monitor an
employee’s physical actions and environmental conditions to identify risks and
prevent overexertion. 162 Initially this sounds like a positive change, but it would not
take much for employers to use the same information to invalidate claims for
workers compensation because someone did something that the wearable
technology did not recommend. Like in the alleged rape case involving a Fitbit
device, wearable technology could verify or discredit an employee’s story.
Individuals in low-income groups are susceptible to this type of monitoring because
they often work in service or labor industries, and they are already prone to
additional workplace surveillance.
III. LESSENING SOCIOECONOMIC PRIVACY DISPARITIES
Since the technology industry is continually developing invasive technologies
that affect privacy, especially for individuals in low-income groups, intervention is
necessary to protect people’s privacy. If privacy is best conceptualized as a public
good, then the question becomes whether companies provide enough privacy to
satisfy the public need. Based on the various industries that are incorporating data
collection into previously innocuous locations and goods, the private sector is
presently failing to provide enough privacy. The push for government intervention
regarding data and privacy has accelerated as more companies mismanage data. 163
Even Apple CEO Tim Cook has stated that the government should intervene and
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impose regulations to protect consumer rights and privacy. 164 Any regulation to
protect individual privacy would have to simultaneously make privacy accessible.
Otherwise, the solution would create a privacy floor that would still be inaccessible
for lower socioeconomic groups.
Privacy legislation is regularly proposed in the House and Senate but
generally not enacted. Currently, there is legislation before the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation that could help limit exploitative data
collection practices. 165 The aptly named DATA Privacy Act would apply to entities
that collect information from more than 3,000 individuals, and it would allow
individuals to request that their information be deleted. 166 Similar legislation has
been proposed in the House that would give people unprecedented control over their
collected data. 167 This includes rights to access, correct, and delete collected data
while also ensuring that people’s data are not collected for behavioral
personalization168 without affirmative consent. 169
These bills address the underlying incentives that companies have to collect
and analyze data. For instance, prohibiting behavioral personalization would limit
data collection for in-car advertising and for gathering location information from
smartphones and wearables to recommend nearby services or stores. This would
ensure that cheaper, more invasive technology would have legal incentives to
protect privacy because they would be more accountable to consumers. However,
addressing how companies may use collected data affects that data’s inherent value.
This could create another problem in which technology that would typically be
available to individuals in low-income groups (because it collects valuable data)
might disappear because companies would want to recoup their losses through
upfront pricing. Such is the relationship between Apple and Google: Apple prices
privacy at a premium because they use less data for research and advertising while
Google prices their devices cheaper because, while they value privacy, they use
more personal information for valuable research. 170
Another approach is to prohibit the use of egregiously invasive technology in
places in which it could discriminate based on socioeconomic status. This has
already happened with facial recognition technology. Several cities and one state
have enacted laws and ordinances that prohibit law enforcement from using facial
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recognition technology because it has discriminatory impacts. 171 These bans affect
government use of facial recognition, which is a positive step to prevent government
surveillance of low-income and minority groups. These enactments do not affect the
use of facial recognition technology by private companies, though. Most recently,
Portland, Oregon, took facial recognition concerns further by considering whether to
ban facial recognition technology for airlines and private companies. 172 City officials
have cited facial recognition’s bias against people of color and women as reasons for
opposing the technology. 173 Banning the technology, which so often discriminates
against minorities, would help individuals in low-income groups who are
particularly susceptible to facial recognition because low-income surveillance and
minority status correlate. 174
There is also federal legislation aimed at stopping the use of facial
recognition technology. The bill focuses on banning facial recognition technology
from federally funded public housing, 175 which is specifically meant for low-income
groups. Such a prohibition would protect low-income and associated minority groups
from extra surveillance and preserve their privacy. This approach also does not ban
the technology outright but rather focuses on banning it in situations that could
facilitate discrimination.
Based on the approaches in actual or proposed legislation, there are two ways
to address privacy’s relationship with wealth. First, individuals in low-income
groups should be protected from privacy invasions that specifically target them
because they have a low income. This involves prohibiting invasive technology to
monitor individuals in low-income groups, whether that be in housing, employment,
or elsewhere. Second, the government can regulate how companies use collected
data and reduce the incentive to collect data that exploits these individuals.
However, this approach comes with the downside that devices might increase in
price because companies will not profit from collecting data after purchase.
Alternatively, the government could restrict the ability for companies to
market products based on privacy. Unfortunately, this solution would create a
privacy floor that would still discriminate against low-income individuals who
might be unable to afford products that meet the privacy floor. Furthermore, this
approach would allow companies to avoid acknowledging how they protect data
unless there is a requirement that companies meet certain standards for data
171
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privacy. The standards could include certain privacy rights like a right to deletion of
information if someone requests it. This would balance concerns about marketing
privacy, which would overtly discriminate against individuals in low-income groups
because privacy would cost more, and concerns that privacy could be ignored
altogether without some requisite amount of privacy protection. While there is no
legislation that incorporates both measures right now, this is a potential solution.
CONCLUSION
Despite existing and demonstrated privacy risks, “people say they are
concerned about their privacy yet repeatedly take actions that fail to protect it.” 176
It can sometimes be difficult to protect privacy if protection requires sacrificing
something that is considered commonplace or essential. Other cases, such as in the
market for wearable technology, involve mere conveniences which people could
more easily sacrifice. However, if alternatives are unavailable or the cost of such
alternatives are too high, individuals in low-income groups cannot use their money
to show disapproval.
Currently, the tech industry is siphoning more data through their products.
Either technology becomes cheaper because there is data collection or technology
that protects privacy becomes more expensive to offset the profits that could be
gained from data collection. Both of these cases present risks for individuals in lowincome groups who must interact with more invasive technology because
alternatives are inaccessible. Whether the government will intervene to protect
individuals in low-income groups is another question entirely, but the government
is best situated to address these privacy concerns.
Until the government intervenes in some capacity, it is likely that companies
will continue to exploit data collection practices that diminish privacy for
individuals in low-income groups.

176

Savage, supra note 31, at 109.

